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CHARLES E. PARTRIDGE, JR.*

Political and Economic Coercion:
Within the Ambit of
Article 52 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties?
Part I. Introduction
"(L)es princes... ne sont point libres, iis sont gouvern~s par la
force ....De i ilsuit que les trait6s qu'ils ont faits par la force sont aussi
obligatoires que ceux qu'ils auraient faits de bon gr6."' Perhaps we have
come a long way from the days of Montesquieu, perhaps not.
The present effort concerns itself with this fact of international life as it
is dealt with in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969. In
particular, it examines whether Article 52 of the Convention, which provides, "A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or
use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in
the Charter of the United Nations," reaches, or should reach the situation
where a treaty is concluded as a result of the application of political or
economic force by a party to it.
For the Convention to ignore that such factors play a fundamental role
in the global political system is surely to ignore reality to an extent that
would vindicate even the most severe critics of a juristic approach to
2
international relations.
Conversely, to abrogate all treaties which shall hereafter be made (assuming the Convention will be given prospective effect only) out of political and/or economic pressure, however subtle, would, in the author's view,
spell the end for treaties as a viable source of international law and render
*B.A., Univ. of Maryland (1968); currently a third-year law student at Univ. of Maryland Law School.
"'Princes are not free in the least, they are governed by force. It follows then that the
treaties which they have made as a result of force are equally as binding as those they would
have made in good faith" MONTESQUIEU, DE L'EsPIRIT DES Lois, Book XXVI, Chapter XX,
17482 (translation the author's).
H1.J. MORGANTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS (2d ed. 1954), pp. 270-274.
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them largely meaningless as a contractual mechanism for stabilizing relations between states.
Given the historical context of dealing with the problem of constraint in
treaty making and the setting of world politics at the beginning of the last
third of the twentieth century, the Convention chose a course somewhere
between these two extremes. Just where that course lies, and, to a greater
degree, where it should lie are matters of considerable controversy.
Part II. Legislative History of Article 52
Article 13 of the United Nations Charter provides, "The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of:
(a) promoting international co-operation in the political field and encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification." Pursuant to that last end, the General Assembly resolved. 3 that the
International Law Commission should undertake the codification of the
law of treaties.
Accordingly, during 1962 and early 1963, Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur to the Commission, 4 prepared reports containing drafts of
the fundamental principles of the law of treaties which were to be considered by the Commission. The first of his reports was submitted to the
Commission at its 673rd meeting on 6 May 1963. Subsequently, the Commission consumed nearly five years in deliberation on the topic.
Insofar as it pertained to the question of treaties concluded out of
constraint, Sir Humphrey's original draft provided, "Article 12. Consent to
a Treaty Procured by the Illegal Use of Threat of Force. 1. If a state is
coerced into entering into a treaty through an act of force, employed
against it in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the state in question shall be entitled -(a) to declare that the coercion
nullifies its consent to be bound by the treaty ab initio; or ....
Sir Humphrey's comments to Article 12 are interesting in two respects.
First, they clearly indicate that it was his intention in that article to
3

General Assembly Resolution 1686 (XVI), 18 December 1961.
Sir Humphrey was preceded in this capacity by Messrs. Brierly (1949-52), Lauterpacht
(1953-55) and Fitzmaurice (1956-60). They, too, submitted reports on the topic, but these
were not widely discussed in the Commission.
5
Second Report on the Law of Treaties by Sir Humphrey Waldock, 20 March 1963,
A/CN.4/156, p. 44. The article goes on to enumerate other remedies which would be available
to the aggrieved state such as to affirm its assent to the treaty while reserving a right not to be
bound as long as the coercion continued, and others. The issue of electing among several
remedies versus avoidance ab initio was the subject of a great deal of debate both in the
International Law Commission and in the Convention itself. That question will not be further
discussed here except to note that the final form of Convention Article 52 adopts exclusively
the ab initio view.
4
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proscribe the use of armed force: "On the other hand, if coercion were
regarded as extending to other forms of pressure upon a state, to political
or economic pressure, the door to the evasion of treaty obligations might
be opened very wide ...."6 Secondly, as to the question of whether the
word "force" as used in the draft is synonymous with "armed force" from
the point of view of future construction, the way in which Sir Humphrey
uses the word in the following sentence might suggest an answer in the
affirmative: "Accordingly ...the Special Rapporteur feels that it would be
unsafe in the present state of international law to extend the notion of
coercion beyond the illegal use or threat of force." 7 Or does it merely beg
the question?
That the Special Rapporteur's draft would be controversial was never in
doubt. Immediately upon beginning consideration of his Article 12, the
members of the Commission found themselves aligned on opposite sides of
the issue, and, quite predictably, the division was largely along the lines of
the historical posture of the member states during the imperialist era.
Mssrs. Gros of France, de Luna of Spain, and Briggs of the United States
agreed with Sir Humphrey's view for the stated reasons that treaty obligations might otherwise be flouted with impunity in contravention of the
hallowed maxim pacta sunt servanda.
Commission members Bartos and Paredes, representing Yugoslavia and
Ecuador, respectively, disagreed with the draft to the extent that they felt
economic and political coercion should be expressly included as giving rise
to the same result as coercion through armed force. They reasoned, quite
logically, that it would be one thing to exclude any mention of coercion of
whatever kind from the Commission's draft, but, inasmuch as it was generally agreed that international law had evolved to a point where an exception should be made for treaties concluded out of military coercion, 8 the
distinction between military and other forms of coercion was artificial at
best, and indeed that economic pressure brought to bear on, for example,
an agrarian, one-crop state could be far more devastating than military
conquest. And so the debates went, 9 and after all had been given an
opportunity to have their comments reflected in the record, the matter was
submitted to the Drafting Committee.
That committee achieved a compromise of sorts whereby it re-drafted
Article 12 in much more general language: "Any treaty the conclusion of
which was procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the
6

1d., Commentary to art. 12, p. 47.
Id.
8
See infra., Part III, p. 761,et seq.
9
1.L.C. Meetings 681, 682, 683, I.L.C. Yearbook; 1963, Vol. 1, pp. 52-62.
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principles of the Charter of the United Nations shall be void."' 0 This
version was reported out of the Drafting Committee at the 705th Meeting
of the Commission, 21 June 1963, and, after very abbreviated debate, was
adopted by a vote of nineteen for, none against and one abstention." This
version remained unchanged and was reported in final form as Article 36 of
the International Law Commission's Draft Articles of the Law of Treaties.
Articles were subsequently circulated through the Secretary General to
all United Nations Member States. Views of those Member States who
chose to reply were heard by the Sixth Committee at the seventeenth and
eighteenth sessions of the General Assembly. In all, thirty states replied.
It is important to note here, for the purpose of determining what future
construction must be given the word "force," that the overwhelming majority of the states' comments,' 2 as well as the 19-0 vote in the Commission,
indicated unequivocal assent to the article. In light of the vociferous debates between the Commission members and their seemingly irreconcilable
differences regarding the political and economic coercion issue, I think it is
fair to assume that the large number of states who were opposed to the
Special Rapporteur's rather detailed article considered the much more
general one which emerged from the Drafting Committee to be indeed a
compromise, and that the word "force" as there used was to be given a
broad construction-certainly not one which would summarily exclude
economic and political coercion. In other words, in view of the lopsided
vote and comments, it is no longer intellectually honest to cite Sir Humphrey's Commentary to Article 12 as a definitive interpretation of the mean3
ing of the word "force.'
Upon consideration of the comments of Member States, the International Law Commission drew the Final Draft Article on the Law of
Treaties for eventual submission to the General Assembly. In the Final
Draft, the article under discussion emerged as Article 49, which is identical
in wording to Vienna Convention Article 52: "Coercion of a State by the
Threat or Use of Force. A treaty is void if its conclusion has been
procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.' 4 Although its form was changed slightly from the Draft Article (Article 36),
the modification does not materially aid in interpretation of the economic
and political coercion issue.
'ld., at 211.
'lid.,
at 213.
12
Comments by Governments on Parts I and 11 of the Draft Law of Treaties, 23
February 1965, A/CN.4/175, pp. 254- 267.
"aSee supra note 6.
148 International Legal Materials 698, July 1969.
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The Final Draft Articles were submitted to the General Assembly by
the International Law Commission in the report on the work of its eigh15
teenth session.
The Final Draft, too, was subject of prolific comments submitted by
Member States. On the whole, those Member States which responded
applauded Article 49 for recognizing the concept that a treaty concluded
out of coercion must be a nullity. But on the question of what constituted
coercion, the old debates were opened anew. The views of the United
States and Cuba are fairly representative.
The United States was unhappy with the wording to the extent that
unless threat or use of force were more clearly defined, such as making
clear that the threat or use of armed force would be required, it could serve
to destroy the stability of treaty relationships.16 Cuba, on the other side of
the coin, pointed out that strangulation of a country's economy is equally
as coercive as the threat or use of armed force, and that any restrictive
interpretation placed on the word "force" to exclude economic measures
would violate the spirit of the United Nations Charter.' 7
It can be seen then that the apparent compromise achieved by the
Drafting Committee served only to extend the debate as to the meaning of
the word "force." Thus, during the Vienna Convention itself many of the
same arguments were voiced.
The most exhausting discussion of the political and economic coercion
issue came during the debate of the Committee of the Whole at its fortyeighth meeting, 2 May 1968. There the issue was framed more formally in
an amendment offered by nineteen states' 8 which would have expressly
added to the language of Article 49 "economic and political coercion"' 19 in
addition to the threat or use of force.
The Japanese delegation articulated the major objection to such an
amendment, which had been largely ignored in the earlier debates in the
International Law Commission; that, although political and economic coercion were equally as reprehensible as the threat or use of armed force, "the
terms 'political and economic pressure' had not been adequately defined
' 5 Official Records, General Assembly, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 9, A/6309/Rev. 1, pt. 11,
ch. 11.6
1 Analytical Compilation of Comments and Observations Made in 1966 and 1967 with
Respect to the Final Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties (hereinafter referred to as
Analytical Compilation) Vol. 11, p. 286.
171d., at 273.
"8 Afghanistan, Algeria, Bolivia, Congo (Brazzaville), Ecuador, Ghana, Guinea, India,
Kenya, Kuwait, Mali, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Syria, United Arab Republic, United Republic
of Tanzania, Yugoslavia and Zambia (hereinafter referred to as the Afghanistan Amendment).
19 A/CONF. 39/C.I/L.67/Rev. l/Corr. 1.
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and established in law to be included in the Convention as a ground for
20
invalidating a treaty."
Otherwise, the opponents of the amendment were conspicuous by their
silence except to reiterate their concern for the continued survival of the
doctrine pacta sunt servanda. Proponents argued that the amendment was
necessary: 1) to reflect the economic and political reality of contemporary
world society, 2) to enhance respect for international law among newly
independent states which, even in the very recent past, had been subjected
to disadvantageous treaty terms out of economic and political pressure, 3)
that to separate economic and political coercion from the threat or use of
armed force was to recognize a distinction without a difference and 4) in
regard to the argument advanced that no workable standard for economic
and political coercion could be established, that this problem was no less
troublesome with the threat of armed force, yet the opponents of the
21
Afghanistan Amendment were silent on that point.
It is suggested that the Afghanistan Amendment would have carried by a
clear majority of the states parties to the Conference if it were pressed to a
vote, but that opponents of the measure were so strenuously insistent on
their position that they made it quite clear that adoption of the amendment
would wreck the Convention altogether. 22 The resolution of this conflict
found form in an agreement by the member states to assent to the article as
worded in the Final Draft, provided that the Conference adopt a declaration as part of the Final Act of the Conference which condemned coercion
in any form, military, economic or political. The full text of the declaration
23
is set out in the note.
Given the adoption of the Declaration by a vote of 102 to none, with
20

Official Records, United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties (hereinafter
referred
2 1 to as Conference Official Records), First Session, p. 272.
1d., at 269-293. Both sides advanced arguments why their respective points of view
were in consonance with the spirit and letter of the Charter of the United Nations. Those
contentions are omitted here, but will be dealt with separately in PART IV, infra, p. 19.
22
Kearney and Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 A.J.I.L. 495 (1970).
23
"The United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Upholding the principle that
every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good
faith, Reaffirming the principle of sovereign equality of States, Convinced that States must
have complete freedom in performing any act relating to the conclusion of a treaty, Deploring
the fact that in the past States have been sometimes forced to conclude treaties under pressure
exerted in various forms by other States, Desiring to insure that in the future no such pressure
will be exerted in any form by any State in connexion with the conclusion of a treaty, 1.
Solemnly condemns the threat or use of pressure in any form, whether military, political or
economic, by any State in order to coerce another State to perform any act relating to the
conclusion of a treaty in violation of the principles of sovereign equality of the States and
freedom of consent; 2. Decides that the present Declaration shall form part of the Final Act of
the Conference on the Law of Treaties." reported at 8 International Legal Materials 733
(1969).
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four abstentions 24 and probably a good deal of undocumented, behindthe-scenes, political suasion between the first and second sessions, the
Conference adopted (then) Article 49 by a vote of ninety-eight for, none
25
against and five abstentions.
Part III. Historical Background of the Principle
Prior to the United Nations
The concept that treaties concluded out of constraint, that is, any form
of coercion, are void would be a relative newcomer to the body of public
international law. The nineteenth century view was almost universally held
to be that, absent any coercion imposed on the individual representatives
of a state or on the individuals responsible for ratification of a treaty, the
exercise of pressure in whatever form by one state or another was not
sufficient to abrogate the treaty by the party so coerced. It was not until the
promulgation of the Covenant of the League of Nations in 1919 and
Kellogg-Briand Pact nine years later, that the concept of vitiation of
treaties made out of resort to war or threats to resort thereto began to find
favor in international law.
Those landmarks in the evolution of international law, of course, merely
placed certain limitations on the practice of resort to war. Whether their
provisions had direct relation to the law of treaties was unclear at best. In
an effort to resolve this apparent ambiguity, the League in 1932, adopted
the following Resolution: "The Assembly ...declares that it is incumbent
upon Members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation,
treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the
covenant of the League of Nations or the Pact of Paris (The Kellog-Briand
26
Pact)."
Even at that the argument may be made that an exception to the rule
was recognized as a matter of customary international law where the treaty
was one which was concluded on the termination of military hostilities.
Certainly most of the members of the League expected Germany to live up
to the stringent exigencies of the Treaty of Versailles. Indeed, McNair
suggests that none of the defeated powers after World War I ever alleged
that it should not be required to comply with the Treaty of Versailles by
virtue of its assent to the Treaty being procured out of the threat of force,
27
namely the continuation of the war.
As late as 1935, The Harvard Research speaks of treaties concluded
24

Conference Official Records, Second Session, p. 101.
at 93.
6Reported at McNair, Law of Treaties 1961, p. 210.
27
1d., at 209.
25
1d.,
2
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under duress only in terms of coercion of an individual who is a representative of a state or a ratifier of treaty.28 Only by a highly strained construction of Article 32 whereby a kind of vicarious coercion of a state might be
imputed to its ratifier could one find any support for the view that treaties
concluded out of coercion of one state by another are void. That this
construction is artificial and indeed unjustified is made clear in the thoroughgoing Comment to Article 32. It recognizes and even applauds the
evolution of international law toward such a principle, but it concludes that
such could not fairly be said to be the state of the law in 1935, and that the
article on duress goes only to the personal arm-twisting of an individual.
Hackworth states the same view quite vividly by way of an example.
After World War I, Germany was required by Article 145 of the Versailles
Treaty to transfer certain stock which it held in the Bank of Morocco to a
nominee of the French government. Relative to the validity of this transaction, Hackworth cites a statement by a Mr. Nielsen, then Solicitor for the
U. S. Department of State: "Even though a vanquished nation is in effect
compelled to sign a treaty, I think that in contemplation of law its signature
29
is regarded as voluntary.
Lauterpacht's edition of Oppenheim's International Law, although
roughly to the same effect, analyzes the problem along the lines of the
legitimacy of war. He reasons that, inasmuch as war was a legitimate
means to change existing international law, the doctrine that a vanquished
state is bound by a treaty imposed by the victor was a "necessary corollary" thereto. But in light of the Covenant and the Pact, Lauterpacht finds a
broad avenue for exception which was to ripen into a tenet of contemporary international law: "The position has now probably changed insofar as
war has been prohibited b the Covenant of the League of Nations and the
General Treaty for the Renunciation of War. The state who has resorted to
war in violation of its obligations under these instruments cannot be held to
apply force in a manner permitted by law. Accordingly, duress in such
30
cases must, it is submitted, be regarded as vitiating the treaty."
Charles de Visscher, on the other hand, writing as recently as 1960,
recognizes no such exception even though his work follows both the
Covenant of the League of Nations and the United Nations Charter. He,
like the so-called realists, recognizes that the jurisprudence of international
affairs has not yet achieved the sophistication to be able to adopt what is
28

Research in International Law under the Auspices of the Faculty of the Harvard Law
School, Part III, art. 32, (1935).
29
Hackworth, DIGEST OF INT'L LAW, Vol. 5, p. 157 (1943).
30
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. I, p. 892, § 499 (Lauterpacht Edition, 8th ed.,
1955).
International Lawyer, Vol. 5, No. 4

Politicaland Economic Coercion
universally recognized as a fundamental principle of municipal contract
law, namely that a contracting party's freedom to assent to his agreement is
a basic requisite to the subsequent enforcement of that agreement. He
suggests that this primitive characteristic of international law may be explained by the prominent role which force continues to play in the affairs
between states, and that it may be and indeed is justified "up to a certain
31
point" by the needs of world order.
Thus it is fairly clear that prior to the Covenant of the League of
Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, international law recognized no
treaty-vitiating doctrine as a result of the threat or use of armed force.
Somewhere subsequent to those landmarks and up to and including the
adoption of the Charter of the United Nations, the state of international
law (with the notable exception of de Visscher) can be fairly said to have
evolved to a point where such a doctrine was recognized with a possible
reservation for treaties concluded at the termination of hostilities between
the victor and the vanquished. Given this trend toward sophistication in
international law, it follows that the next step in the evolution process
would be to recognize a treaty-invalidating theory based on the more subtle
types of coercion arising out of the exercise of political and economic
pressures.
Part IV. The Advent of the United Nations
and Current Views
The Charter of the United Nations is silent on the question of the threat
or use of force as it specifically pertains to the law of treaties. Yet any
discussion of the question subsequent to 1945 is wholly inadequate without
reference to that document.
Indeed, Article 52 of the Vienna Convention expressly qualifies "threat
or use of force" by providing that such threat or use must be of the kind
which is a violation of "the principles of international law embodied in the
Charter of the United Nations."
The questions of whether the Charter has become part of the body of
international law and just which provisions are referred to are matters on
which there is some difference of opinion. 32 Assuming arguendo that the
basic Charter (i.e. the Preamble and Articles I through 11) has become
customary international law by reason of assent to it by virtually all the
states on Earth, it is clear that the drafters at Vienna had in mind Article 2,
31

DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW,

lation,
32 p. 254 (rev. ed., 1968).

GOODRICH, THE UNITED NATIONS,
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Paragraph 4: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations."
The question of what constitutes force was subject to roughly the same
arguments at the San Francisco Conference as in the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties. z3 It is notable that the drafters of the Dumbarton
Oaks Proposal 34 which, on this point, was adopted at San Francisco
without revision, made the conscious effort to avoid the term "resort to
war" which was the comparable language of the covenant of the League of
Nations. 35 "Resort to war" and "the threat or use of (even exclusively
military) force" differ substantially enough in their ordinary meaning so as
to indicate a significant broadening of the doctrine. That such a broadening
over the Covenant language is sufficient to embrace political and economic
coercion, however, has not found favor with the writers.
Although writing almost contemporaneously with the adoption of the
Charter, Messrs. Goodrich and Hambro's Charter of the United Nations is

still recognized as an authoritative statement of interpretation; on the point
in question, they say: "While the Paragraph (Article 2, Paragraph 4) is not
explicit on the point, the discussions at San Francisco, other provisions of
the Charter and common usage strongly suggest that the word 'force' is to
be understood in the sense of 'physical force' or 'armed force.' The coercion or attempted coercion of states by economic or psychological methods
may be undesirable and contrary to certain of the declared purposes of the
United Nations, but the obligation of this paragraph is not directed against
36
action of this kind."
Professor McDougal opts for a case by case determination of the meaning of force as it is used in Article 2, Paragraph 4. He would make a
distinction between what he terms "major coercions-those directed
against the territorial integrity of states -and minor coercions, which are all
the rest-reprisals, boycotts and the like." 3 7 Moreover he suggests that it is
material to consider whether such coercions are internal or external to the
state affected, and whether they are accidental or intended.
His initial reaction to the Charter was that all forms of coercion were
outlawed, but he cites that subsequent experience has been to permit "with
33
See
4

supra notes 16- 20.
3 Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization, reported at I I U. S. Dept. of State Bulletin 368.
35
Articles 12, 13 and 15.
36 First Edition, 1946; Second Edition, 1949, p. 104.
37
American Society of International Law, Proceedings, 1963, p. 163.
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impunity" these so-called minor coercions, the net effect being that Article
2, Paragraph 4 has led to a far greater tolerance of coercion than was the
case under international law before the advent of the United Nations.
Professor Henkin, on the other hand, feels that Article 2, Paragraph 4's
qualification of the use of force as that which is "inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations" should be interpreted as placing a severe
restriction on coercion of all types. Unlike Professor McDougal, he does
not see Article 2 as abandoning any principles of international law regarding coercion (the doctrine of proportionality, for example) which were in
effect before the Charter. Rather, he envisions the Charter as an addition
or supplement to those rules. 38 His view is that the Charter not only
undertakes to proscribe major coercions, but, in the process, preserves and
expands the former restrictions on the minor ones.
The Charter recognizes fewer exceptions to the prohibition of the use of
force than did the Covenant. The Charter's principal exception 39 is contained in Article 5 1: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations. ..." The questions of

just what constitutes "self-defense" and, where to draw the line regarding
"armed attack" have been the subject of prolific debate and commentary.
Even the most cursory analysis of these arguments is beyond the scope of
the present undertaking.
Nevertheless, there is the proposition that the self-defense exception
bears at least indirectly on the problem of coercion in the conclusion of
treaties. Self-defense, so the argument goes, is a major exception to the
general prohibition of the use of force in the Charter. Inasmuch as Vienna
Convention Article 52 qualifies coercion as that which is a violation of the
principles of the Charter of the United Nations, isn't it conceivable that
whatever type of force might qualify under the self-defense exception could
be used by a state in the conclusion of a treaty without running afoul of
Convention Article 52? The author believes this argument fails for want of
practical, common-sense support, especially in regard to the type of force
which would be used in self-defense.
Charter Article 51 expressly qualifies the right to employ force under the
self-defense shelter by providing that the exercise of this kind of force can
come only after and as a result of an armed attack. While there may be
some difference of opinion as to the meaning of "armed attack," such as
whether it includes an isolated border skirmish involving very few troops,
38

39

1d., at 165.

The other exceptions being United Nations authorization and consent of the state
attacked.
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or the insurrectionary situation where terrorist tactics are used, the prevailing view is that it has reference to open, hostile, aggressive, military
40
attack.
The kind of force which the Charter would permit a state to employ in
self-defense would surely have to be of a sufficient severity and magnitude,
in light of the defending state's capacity to meet such an attack. In all
likelihood it would not be of the economic and political variety. It would be
too late for those more subtle forms of coercion. True, it could be argued
that if Cuba, for example, were to perpetrate some rather minor violence
against the United States, the latter in retaliation, that is, in self-defense,
might order a blockade of that island state for the purpose of economic
strangulation, thus amounting to an economically coercive measure used as
self-defense against armed attack.
Apart from the likelihood of such a factual situation being highly remote,
isn't it fair to say that such a blockade would really constitute the threat, if
not the use, of armed force? The objective might be an economic one but
the means, namely air and naval blockade, surely would fall within even
the narrowest definition of the word "force."
Contemporary authorities largely share the view that, while recognizing
the vitiating effect of armed force used in the conclusion of treaties,
economic, political or psychological intimidation are beyond the scope of
the rule. McNair states the view, if only by implication, as follows: "the
change of attitude referred to above (i.e., the modern trend to recognize the
invalidity of treaties made out of military coercion) in no way impairs the
validity of treaties concluded as the result, say, of economic or financial
necessity without any use or threat of force .... -41
The American Law Institute's Restatement (Second) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States provides little help. It treats of the
topic relying heavily on extrinsic authority: "Section 116. Subject Matter
of International Agreement. An international agreement may be made with
respect to any matter except to the extent that the agreement conflicts with
(a) the rules of international law incorporating the basic standards of
international conduct, or (b) the obligations of a member state under the
Charter of the United Nations." 42 In fact, Chapter Five of the Restatement, which deals with "Modification, Suspension and Termination of
40

American Society of International Law, Proceedings, 1963, p. 164, Professor Quincy
would indeed amend the wording to read: "if and only if an actual attack occurs."
Wright
41
McNair, op. cit., p. 210.
421965, p. 368.
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International Agreements," is altogether silent on the effect of coercion as
43
a possible grounds for termination.
In 1962 the General Assembly created the Special Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States. 44 Item number one on its agenda was then, and
continues to be, to study "(a) The principle that States shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any State, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."4
In 109 meetings spanning a full seven years, the Special Committee has
not been able to agree on the definition of the word "force." Virtually all
members are in accord that military force is clearly included, but as to
economic and political coercion, the divisions are spirited and deep. 46 The
most recent pronouncement of the Committee is that, although agreement
has not been achieved, a good foundation has been established and that,
with the indulgence of the General Assembly, the discussions will resume
47
next year.
Part V. Conclusion and Opinion
Article 52 of the Vienna Convention will not invalidate a treaty which
was concluded as the result of political and/or economic coercion. Its
turbulent legislative history, especially in light of the simultaneous adoption
of the Declaration mentioned above, might suggest that these more subtle
forms of pressure are proscribed. Legislative history notwithstanding, there
are two powerful reasons which compel a different result. First, the Article
is too inextricably bound up with the United Nations Charter to ignore the
prevailing interpretation which has been placed on that instrument, namely
that it does not reach political and economic intimidation. Second, inasmuch as the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties purports to be a
codification of international law as it stands in 1969, if the Article were to
attempt to reach all forms of coercion, it would do so in the face of
contrary expressions by nearly all the authorities from the Harvard Research and Lauterpacht to McNair.
Current trends, of course, are clearly on the side of those who opt for
the broad interpretation. And if, as suggested, the Afghanistan Amendment
43Id., at 476.
44General Assembly Resolution 1815 (XVII), 18 December 1962.
45d.
'6Summary of the Proceedings, 18 August to 19 September 1969, A/AC. 125/SR.97- 109.
471969 Report, A/7619.
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would have carried by a substantial majority of states members to the
Conference, the argument may be made that the broader view will become
a rule of cutomary international law. But in 1970 this is a matter of mere
conjecture, especially since customary international law develops painfully
48
slowly in the treaty area.
Finally, it seems that adoption of the broad prohibition would pose some
unsettling conceptual difficulties. In this, the heyday of behavioral analysis
in the social sciences, we cannot help but be aware that states-in this
respect much like their private contracting counterparts in the municipal
setting-enter into agreements as they perceive the terms of those agreements to be in their best interests. Given the recognition that "international
relations" is in effect a global political and economic system, these interests
almost by definition are political and economic in nature. Wouldn't a rule
which says that treaties are void to the extent that they were made out of
political and economic pressure be tantamount to saying that treaties are
void to the extent that they were made in the perceived best interests of the
parties?
The rejoinder to that argument, of course, is that the pressure must be
coercive. Few would disagree, for example, that for a state, by itself or in
conspiracy with others, to boycott the product of a one-crop or
one-product state in order to secure an advantageous treaty with it would
clearly fall on the prohibited side of the coercion line. Likewise, where the
state meddles in the domestic political affairs of another (such as to give
substantial financial support to the party in power) for the same purposes,
the line is not difficult to draw.
Yet the situation where a power such as the United States enters into an
agreement with, say, a Latin American state to furnish economic assistance, provided that a large portion-perhaps 90%-of the aid must be
spent in the United States is a far closer case. Assume that the agreement
was for the purpose of developing mechanized agriculture in the smaller
state in return for preferential tariff treatment of United States manufactured goods. Would it make any difference that tractors and other farm
equipment were available from Japan at half the cost of comparable American products? Or that the domestic economy of the state so pressured
could ill afford a low tariff policy?
These are just two of the complex, interrelated questions which must be
capable of resolution before any yardstick of what constitutes coercion
can become workable. If indeed they can be answered, then the broad
48

McNair, op. cit., p. 207.
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interpretation of Convention Article 52 is in order. The difficulty, however,
will be to keep such a standard free of tenuous and artificial distinctions.
Professor McNair states the view quite simply and practically: ". . . nearly
every treaty contains some provisions which represent hard bargaining and
which one of the parties would much like to have avoided." 49 These types
of provisions are not necessarily coercive.

9

4 0p. cit., p. 2 10.
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